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2 T.W. Fawcett et al. / Behavioural Processes 
The tendency of animals to seek instant gratification instead of waiting for greater long-term 14 
benefits has been described as impatient, impulsive or lacking in self-control. How can we 15 
explain the evolution of such seemingly irrational behaviour? Here we analyse optimal 16 
behaviour in a variety of simple choice situations involving delayed rewards. We show that 17 
preferences for more immediate rewards should depend on a variety of factors, including 18 
whether the choice is a one-off or is likely to be repeated, the information the animal has 19 
about the continuing availability of the rewards and the opportunity to gain rewards through 20 
alternative activities. In contrast to the common assertion that rational animals should devalue 21 
delayed rewards exponentially, we find that this pattern of discounting is optimal only under 22 
restricted circumstances. We predict preference reversal whenever waiting for delayed 23 
rewards entails loss of opportunities elsewhere, but the direction of this reversal depends on 24 
whether the animal will face the same choice repeatedly. Finally, we question the ecological 25 
relevance of standard laboratory tests for impulsive behaviour, arguing that animals rarely 26 
face situations analogous to the self-control paradigm in their natural environment. To 27 
understand the evolution of impulsiveness, a more promising strategy would be to identify 28 
decision rules that are adaptive in a realistic ecological setting, and examine how these rules 29 
determine patterns of behaviour in simultaneous choice tests. 30 
 31 
Keywords: delay discounting; ecological rationality; impulsiveness; intertemporal choice; 32 
optimal foraging; self-control 33 
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1. Introduction 35 
 36 
The way in which animals, including humans, value rewards that occur in the future is 37 
of interest to a broad range of disciplines including economics (Frederick et al., 2002), 38 
psychology (Mazur, 2007a,b), pharmacology (Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Reynolds, 2006), 39 
neuroscience (Berns et al., 2007; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Roesch et al., 2007) and 40 
behavioural ecology (Freidin et al., 2009; Kagel et al., 1986; Kacelnik, 1997, 2003; Stephens, 41 
2002; Stephens and Dunlap, 2009, 2011; Stevens and Mühlhoff, in press; Stevens et al., 42 
2005a). Frequently, studies find that animals reject delayed rewards in favour of more 43 
immediate gratification, even when they would gain greater long-term benefits by waiting 44 
(Ainslie, 1974; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Henly et al., 2008; Mazur, 1987; McDiarmid 45 
and Rilling, 1965; Rachlin and Green, 1972; Stephens and Anderson, 2001). Such behaviour 46 
has been described as impatient (Kacelnik, 2003), impulsive (Henly et al., 2008), short-47 
sighted (Stephens and Anderson, 2001) or lacking in self-control (Mazur and Logue, 1978). 48 
Why is it that animals behave in this way? 49 
Models of behaviour can be categorised as descriptive or normative (Kacelnik, 1997). 50 
Descriptive models summarise what animals do whereas normative models specify what they 51 
ought to do (Houston et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2008). In the context of how animals 52 
evaluate delayed rewards, descriptive models focus on the quantitative details of preferences 53 
measured in the laboratory and seek a mechanistic explanation for the precise patterns we 54 
observe (e.g. Mazur, 2006). Typically, these models do not attempt to explain why particular 55 
discounting mechanisms have evolved. Normative models, in contrast, adopt a functional 56 
perspective and try to understand the evolutionary basis of decision making, asking how 57 
natural selection will shape preferences under natural conditions (e.g. Stephens et al., 2004). 58 
In these models the mechanistic underpinnings of the evolved preferences are usually not 59 
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considered. The two approaches are clearly closely related, because animals tested in the 60 
laboratory are using rules that were shaped in their ancestral environment; but it does not 61 
follow that all aspects of laboratory behaviour will be optimal (Houston and McNamara, 62 
1989, 1999; McNamara, 1996; McNamara and Houston, 1980). 63 
Our aim in this article is to present a simple and general framework for understanding 64 
how natural selection shapes the evaluation of delayed rewards. Thus, our emphasis is on the 65 
functional (normative) approach. We wish to shed light on the following problem: when 66 
faced with a choice between options with differing delays, what should an optimal decision 67 
maker do? What is the precise pattern of discounting it should use to devalue delayed 68 
rewards? 69 
 70 
1.1. Costs of being patient 71 
There are two main reasons why it might be costly, in fitness terms, to wait for a 72 
delayed reward. First, there is a risk that the anticipated reward may become unavailable 73 
before it can be collected (collection risk; Houston et al., 1982). In this context, Stephens 74 
(2002) distinguishes between an interruption risk—the chance of losing the next food item, 75 
for example because a conspecific competitor eats it first—and a termination risk—the 76 
chance that an entire sequence of foraging is cut short, for example because of the sudden 77 
appearance of a predator. Second, even if collection is guaranteed, there may be lost 78 
opportunities associated with the time spent waiting (opportunity cost; Stephens, 2002): 79 
assuming the animal cannot perform other activities while it is waiting, it forgoes the 80 
opportunity to gain rewards by other means (McNamara, 1982). As we will see below, both 81 
the collection risk and the opportunity cost can strongly influence optimal behaviour. 82 
 83 
1.2. Empirical facts to explain 84 
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To give a satisfying explanation of preferences for delayed rewards, there are some key 85 
empirical results that functional models need to account for: hyperbolic discounting, 86 
preference reversal and effects of reward magnitude. 87 
 88 
1.2.1. Hyperbolic discounting 89 
If delayed rewards are discounted at a constant rate per unit of time spent waiting, their 90 
perceived value decays according to an exponential function. For example, if an immediate 91 
reward loses half of its value when it is delayed by 5 minutes, one delayed by 10 minutes 92 
should be half as valuable again (i.e. its value should drop to one quarter of its immediate 93 
value). It is generally agreed that an exponential pattern of discounting should result when 94 
interruptions occur randomly over time (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005; Green and Myerson, 95 
1996; Stevens, 2010). However, empirical data suggest that discounting is not exponential 96 
but hyperbolic, the discounting rate gradually falling with added delay (Ainslie, 1974; Mazur, 97 
1987, 2006). This implies that additional delays do not have much effect on reward valuation 98 
if the delays are already long, in contrast to exponential discounting in which the discount 99 
rate does not change. 100 
 101 
1.2.2. Preference reversal 102 
In the classic ‘self-control’ paradigm (Mazur and Logue, 1978; Fig. 1a), in which an 103 
animal is given a choice between a small reward delivered after a short delay (SS) and a 104 
larger reward after a long delay (LL), it typically shows an impulsive preference for the 105 
former option (Ainslie, 1974; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996; Henly et al., 2008; Mazur, 1987; 106 
McDiarmid and Rilling, 1965; Rachlin and Green, 1972; Stephens and Anderson, 2001). 107 
Increasing both delays by the same amount, however, can sometimes induce a switch to the 108 
more delayed option. This preference reversal has been reported in pigeons (Ainslie and 109 
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Herrnstein, 1981; Green et al., 1981; Rachlin and Green, 1972), rats (Green and Estle, 2003) 110 
and humans, the latter for both hypothetical (Green et al., 1994) and actual (Kirby and 111 
Herrnstein, 1995) amounts of money. Exponential discounting does not predict preference 112 
reversal, whereas hyperbolic discounting can (Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008). 113 
There are two possible forms of preference reversal that are regularly discussed in the 114 
literature, but often not clearly distinguished. The first form occurs across two different 115 
choice situations, involving the same reward magnitudes but with an added delay in one 116 
situation; the animal prefers the more immediate option when the delays are short (Fig. 1a) 117 
and the more delayed option when they are extended (Fig. 1b). The other occurs within the 118 
same choice situation, as time runs forwards: having initially chosen the later reward, the 119 
animal may switch its preference to the sooner reward as its collection point approaches (Fig. 120 
1c). These forms are often treated equivalently (e.g. Casari, 2009; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 121 
2008; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Sozou, 1998) but, as we shall see below, whether it is 122 
valid to do so depends on what we assume about the information that is available to the 123 
animal. 124 
 125 
1.2.3. Effect of reward magnitude 126 
Several accounts of choice assume that delayed options have a value given by R/f(D), 127 
where R is the reward and f(D) is some positive increasing function of delay D. Such 128 
accounts predict that choice will be unaffected when the magnitude of the rewards is 129 
changed, provided their ratio (R1/R2) is kept constant. However, humans discount delayed 130 
rewards less strongly when they are choosing between larger amounts of money (Green et al., 131 
1997, 1999; Myerson and Green, 1995). Similarly, capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) tested 132 
in two separate self-control studies (Addessi et al., 2011; Amici et al., 2008) were 133 
significantly more tolerant for delay when the rewards were larger (2 vs. 6 food items, as 134 
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opposed to 1 vs. 3; for discussion, see Addessi et al., 2011). Rats show a lower rate of 135 
discounting for less concentrated sucrose solutions, which they prefer (Farrar et al., 2003), 136 
but a higher rate of discounting for larger amounts of food (Wogar et al., 1992). Green et al. 137 
(2004) found no effect of reward magnitude in pigeons and rats. 138 
 139 
1.3. Seeking an adaptive explanation 140 
There have been several previous attempts to explain impulsiveness and the evolution 141 
of hyperbolic discounting. Kagel et al. (1986) proposed that if animals are uncertain of the 142 
rate of interruptions (‘hazard’ rate) and have to estimate this, they should gradually lower 143 
their estimate as time passes while they are waiting for a reward. If a long time has elapsed 144 
and an interruption has still not occurred, this indicates that the underlying hazard rate is 145 
likely to be low and an animal should therefore be more willing to wait even longer for a 146 
reward. Sozou (1998) developed this idea into a formal model and showed that estimation of 147 
a constant but unknown hazard rate could produce hyperbolic discounting.  148 
Stephens and colleagues (Stephens, 2002; Stephens et al., 2004) put forward an 149 
alternative explanation for impulsive choice, based on constraints on discrimination. 150 
Assuming that animals can detect a difference between two delays more easily when the 151 
delays are short than when they are long (an example of Weber’s Law; Gibbon, 1977), 152 
decisions might be more accurate when made on the basis of short-term consequences. This 153 
increased accuracy might favour a general tendency to evaluate options in terms of short-term 154 
gains. An alternative approach argues that a hyperbolic decay function can be explained by 155 
assuming that discounting is based on subjective time perception (Takahashi, 2005; 156 
Zauberman et al., 2009). 157 
While interesting and potentially important, these ideas rely on additional factors—158 
uncertainty over the interruption rate, or biases in discrimination—to explain impulsiveness, 159 
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on top of the basic economic considerations of energy (benefit) and time (cost). Here we take 160 
a more fundamental approach. We seek to identify optimal decisions in a variety of simple 161 
choice situations in which the available options differ only in the size of the reward and the 162 
delay till that reward can be collected. The focal animal knows (i.e. is adapted to) the 163 
interruption rate and can discriminate between the options accurately. Under these conditions, 164 
it has repeatedly been claimed that a rational animal should discount delayed rewards 165 
exponentially (e.g. Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kirby and 166 
Herrnstein, 1995). We show that this view is unfounded. Optimal choice between delayed 167 
rewards can cover a variety of different patterns of discounting, depending on whether a 168 
given choice is likely to be repeated (Kacelnik, 1997, 2003; Stephens, 2002) and what 169 
alternative options the animal may have for gaining energy outside the current choice 170 
situation. Our aim is not to develop one definitive model of choice that accounts for all the 171 
empirical observations mentioned above, but to construct a general framework for 172 
investigating these kinds of problems and expose the logic of evaluating delayed rewards. 173 
 174 
 175 
2. A general model of choice between delayed rewards 176 
 177 
We consider an animal facing a choice between different foraging options, each of 178 
which offers a reward after some delay. Our overarching assumption is that natural selection 179 
acts on the total reward obtained by some final time T (Houston and McNamara 1999; 180 
McNamara and Houston, 1986, 1987). For a given option i the net energetic gain from the 181 
reward is Ri, but this is only collected after a delay Di. Given that it has to wait for the 182 
reward, there is a risk that the animal may lose it before it can be collected (e.g. because a 183 
competitor consumes it first or a predator interrupts the foraging bout). If we assume a 184 
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constant interruption rate α during a delay of duration Di, then the chance that the animal 185 
successfully collects the reward is given by the negative exponential function iDe   and the 186 
discounted value of the food reward is therefore i
D
ieR

. Following this delay Di, we assume 187 
that the animal forages at some rate of gain γ for the remaining time T − Di. Thus its expected 188 
total reward by the final time T is 189 
  i
D
ii DTeRH
i    . (1) 190 
If the future gains do not depend on the current options the animal is facing, γT is common to 191 
all options and the best option maximises i
D
i DeR
i   . When facing a choice between 192 
several alternatives differing in the reward amount Ri and the delay Di, we can identify the 193 
best option graphically by plotting i
D
ieR

 against Di, as shown in Fig. 2. 194 
The expression i
D
i DeR
i    neatly captures the essential trade-off between the 195 
energetic gain from the chosen option and the cost of waiting for it. The term γDi is an 196 
opportunity cost (McNamara, 1982): it is the energetic gain that would have been achieved 197 
by seeking rewards elsewhere. Thus γ represents the opportunity cost per unit time. There are 198 
different possible interpretations of γ, depending on the situation we are modelling. If the 199 
animal faces a one-off choice, then γ is simply a ‘background’ rate of energetic gain that is 200 
independent of the options available in the choice situation; it is an externally imposed 201 
parameter. If, on the other hand, the animal faces the same choice situation repeatedly, then γ 202 
is the long-term rate of gain on the choice cycles and is determined by the rewards and delays 203 
of the options available (Kacelnik, 1997, 2003). The importance of this distinction will 204 
become clear in the detailed models presented below. 205 
In keeping with most empirical work on time discounting, we focus on choice decisions 206 
between two options, as illustrated in Fig. 1. One option (smaller–sooner, SS) offers a 207 
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relatively small reward RSS after a short delay DSS, while the other option (larger–later, LL) 208 
offers a larger reward RLL after a longer delay DLL. By definition, RLL > RSS and DLL > DSS. 209 
 210 
 211 
3. One-off choice 212 
 213 
The simplest situation is where the animal faces a one-off choice between SS and LL 214 
and then reverts to some background foraging rate γ. There are two basic cases we need to 215 
consider. 216 
 217 
3.1. Zero opportunity cost (γ = 0) 218 
If the background foraging rate is zero, the animal cannot gain energy through any 219 
other means outside the choice situation; its gains are restricted to the two options SS and LL. 220 
In this case there is no opportunity cost of waiting for a delayed reward, so γ = 0. Then the 221 
best option maximises i
D
ieR

, which implies that choice should be based on standard 222 
exponential discounting. If collection is guaranteed (α = 0) then the animal should simply 223 
wait for the option with the bigger reward (LL), whereas a high risk of interruption favours 224 
the more immediate option (SS). In general (i.e. for any value of α), the animal should choose 225 
the SS option whenever LLSS LLSS
DD
eReR
   , which after rearranging gives the condition 226 
 






SS
LL
LL ln
1
R
R
DD SS

. (2) 227 
The difference DLL − DSS is unchanged when a constant delay is added to both options, 228 
implying that there should be no preference reversal (Fig. 3a). There is also no effect of 229 
reward magnitude on choice provided the reward ratio RLL/RSS does not change. 230 
 231 
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3.2. Non-zero opportunity cost (γ > 0) 232 
When there is some background rate of gain γ > 0, this will influence the animal’s 233 
optimal decision. It should now maximise i
D
i DeR
i   , trading off the potential gains from 234 
the options available in the choice situation against the opportunity cost of not being able to 235 
forage at the background rate while it is waiting for a reward. For short delays, the animal 236 
should prefer the LL option if the reward RLL is sufficiently large. If the delays are increased, 237 
however, there comes a point at which the expected rate of gain from the current choice 238 
situation drops below the background rate of gain. When this happens, the animal should exit 239 
the choice situation as soon as possible, which is achieved by choosing the option with the 240 
shorter delay. So as a constant delay is added to both options, this model predicts a reversal 241 
of preference from the LL to the SS option (Fig. 3b). 242 
We can prove this mathematically. The animal should choose the SS option whenever 243 
LLLLSSSS
LLSS DeRDeR
DD     , which after rearranging gives the condition 244 
 
 SSLL SSLLSSLL
1 DD
eReRDD


  . (3) 245 
For relatively short delays and a sufficiently large value of RLL, this inequality will not be 246 
satisfied and so the animal should choose the LL option. Now consider the effect of adding a 247 
constant delay to both options. The difference DLL − DSS will not change whereas the right-248 
hand side will get smaller, tending to zero as the amount of delay added goes to infinity. As 249 
soon as the right-hand side is smaller than DLL − DSS, the inequality is satisfied and the 250 
animal should switch its preference to the SS option. 251 
In this choice situation there is also an effect of reward magnitude: for a given reward 252 
ratio RLL/RSS, larger rewards will be discounted less strongly than smaller rewards. 253 
 254 
 255 
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4. Repeated choice 256 
 257 
We now consider cases where the animal faces the same choice repeatedly. Once the 258 
delay for its chosen option has elapsed and the animal has collected its reward, the cycle 259 
begins anew with the same two options (SS and LL) available. This changes the economics of 260 
the situation because instead of a fixed background rate, γ now depends on the rewards and 261 
delays of the options chosen on the choice cycles (Kacelnik, 1997, 2003). 262 
To start with, we look at the general case in which the animal adopts behaviour pattern 263 
u over the repeated cycles of choice (u can represent any aspect of behaviour, but we avoid 264 
being specific about this here). Its rate of gain in this situation is the reward obtained per unit 265 
of time spent waiting, or R(u)/D(u). The behaviour u* that maximises this rate is found by 266 
differentiating R(u)/D(u) with respect to u and setting it equal to zero, which after some 267 
rearrangement gives 268 
 
       **** uDuRuDuR   (4) 269 
(where primes denote the first derivative with respect to u). If we denote the maximum 270 
possible rate of gain as γ* = R(u*)/D(u*) and substitute this into equation (4), we get 271 
     0***  uDuR  . (5) 272 
Note that this is equivalent to maximising    *** uDuR  , which has exactly the same 273 
form as the general model outlined in section 2 (for an alternative derivation, see McNamara, 274 
1982). Thus the optimal behaviour in a situation of repeated choice is just a special case of 275 
this general model. 276 
 277 
4.1. Infinite number of cycles 278 
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If the sequence of cycles continues indefinitely, γ is entirely determined by the options 279 
chosen. The long-term rate of gain from repeatedly choosing option i is i
D
i DeR
i  , 280 
which when substituted into equation (1) gives an expected pay-off of 281 
 
T
D
eR
H
i
D
i
i
i
 . (6) 282 
The animal should choose whichever option maximises this pay-off, i.e. the option that gives 283 
the higher rate of gain i
D
i DeR
i . Thus when there is an infinite sequence of cycles, the 284 
animal should follow a strategy of rate maximisation. This predicts a preference reversal from 285 
the SS to the LL option as the delays for both options are increased by a fixed amount (Fig. 286 
4). Choice is unaffected by reward magnitude provided the reward ratio RLL/RSS does not 287 
change. 288 
 289 
4.2. Uncertain number of cycles 290 
Lastly, we consider what happens if there are repeated cycles of choice, but it is 291 
uncertain how long the sequence will continue. We now assume that interruptions, when they 292 
occur, terminate the entire sequence of cycles. This could represent the arrival of a predator, 293 
for example, or of a dominant competitor who displaces the focal animal from the foraging 294 
patch, forcing it to seek gains elsewhere (Houston et al., 1982; Kagel et al., 1986). Such 295 
events happen stochastically at an average rate λ and immediately afterwards the animal 296 
switches to some background rate of gain γ. 297 
Let the random variable Y denote the time elapsed before the sequence is terminated, 298 
and Ni denote the number of cycles completed in this period given that the animal repeatedly 299 
chooses option i. We can write the expected values of these variables as E(Y) and E(Ni), 300 
respectively. The animal gains reward amount Ri for each completed cycle and then forages 301 
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at the background gain rate γ for the remaining time T − E(Y) after the termination has 302 
occurred, so its expected pay-off Hi is 303 
     YTNRH iii EE   . (7) 304 
The expected time before the sequence is terminated is simply the reciprocal of the 305 
termination rate, that is E(Y) = 1/λ. For any given cycle of duration Di the chance that 306 
termination does not occur is iDe
 , so the chance that the sequence is terminated after n 307 
cycles is     ii DnDi eenN    1P . If T is sufficiently large we can treat the possible 308 
values of Ni as an infinite sequence, which gives the expected number of completed cycles as 309 
    



0
1E
n
DnD
i
ii neeN

. (8) 310 
Since 1 iDe  , the infinite series in this equation converges to  2
0
1 iii
DD
n
Dn
eene
 


  , 311 
which leaves us with       111E   iii DDDi eeeN  . Substituting the expressions for 312 
E(Y) and E(Ni) back into the pay-off equation (7), we get 313 
 











1
1
T
e
R
H
iD
i
i . (9) 314 
Since γ(T − 1/λ) is common to all options, the animal should choose whichever option 315 
maximises  1iDi eR  . So it should choose the SS option whenever 316 
 
1
1
LL
SS
LL
SS



D
D
e
e
R
R


. (10) 317 
This inequality is satisfied when the SS option gives an immediate reward (DSS = 0), since the 318 
right-hand side is zero. As both delays are increased by the same amount, however, the right-319 
hand side increases and eventually converges to a value of e−λk, where k = DLL − DSS. This 320 
implies that preference reversal will occur if the rewards and delays of the two options are 321 
15 T.W. Fawcett et al. / Behavioural Processes 
such that RSS/RLL < exp[−λ(DLL − DSS)], with preference switching to the LL option as both 322 
delays are increased. An example of this is shown in Fig. 5. 323 
Note that in this situation there is no effect of reward magnitude on choice provided the 324 
reward ratio RSS/RLL does not change. 325 
 326 
 327 
5. Preference reversals over time 328 
 329 
We have seen that an optimality approach can predict preference reversal when the 330 
delays associated with two options are increased by the same amount. Experimentally, this 331 
scenario corresponds to a comparison between two separate choice situations: in one, the 332 
animal is given a choice between two rewards after delays DSS and DLL (Fig. 1a); in the other, 333 
it is given a choice between the same two rewards after delays DSS + δ and DLL + δ (Fig. 1b). 334 
Preference reversal between these two situations has been documented by several studies 335 
(e.g. Ainslie and Herrnstein, 1981; Green et al., 1981; Green and Estle, 2003; Rachlin and 336 
Green, 1972), with animals preferring a smaller, sooner reward in the former case but a 337 
larger, later reward when the delays are extended to DSS + δ and DLL + δ. 338 
There is another form of preference reversal that we have not yet considered in detail. 339 
After making an initial choice between two options, an animal may have the opportunity to 340 
reverse its decision at a later time point, when the delays to both options have decreased (Fig. 341 
1c). Again the comparison is between a choice when the delays are DSS + δ and DLL + δ 342 
(initial choice) and a choice when the delays are DSS and DLL (later choice), but now we are 343 
dealing with a preference reversal within the same choice situation, as time runs forwards 344 
from t to t + δ. If the animal switches its choice at the later time point t + δ, it is not obvious 345 
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why it would not choose this option in the first place. Is it ever adaptive for an animal to 346 
reverse its choice in this way? 347 
A number of authors (e.g. Casari, 2009; Kalenscher and Pennartz, 2008; Kirby and 348 
Herrnstein, 1995; Sozou, 1998) have treated preference reversal over time as the reverse case 349 
of preference reversal when a constant delay is added to both options: instead of both delays 350 
being extended by the same amount, both delays are shortened by the same amount. But in 351 
fact these two cases are distinct, and the failure to distinguish between them can lead to 352 
misunderstandings. For example, Sozou’s (1998) model of hyperbolic discounting, in which 353 
individuals estimate the underlying hazard rate, predicts greater patience (increased 354 
preference for the LL option) when a fixed delay is added to both options, a pattern supported 355 
by empirical studies comparing two separate choice situations (e.g. Rachlin and Green, 356 
1972). Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) later used Sozou’s logic to predict what would happen 357 
when individuals estimate the underlying hazard rate within a single choice situation, and 358 
argued that it incorrectly predicts increasing patience as time runs forwards. However, to 359 
analyse this type of situation rigorously, an explicit account of the process is needed. Whether 360 
we should expect preference reversal over time depends on how the passage of time affects 361 
the economics of the choice situation. Specifically, the pattern of choice depends on the 362 
information the animal has about the continuing availability of the rewards. Dasgupta and 363 
Maskin (2005) alluded to this point, but they focused on a more complicated choice situation 364 
in which the delays to the two rewards are uncertain. Here we state the distinction in more 365 
general terms. There are two possible scenarios: 366 
Case 1: the passage of time changes the estimated probability of collecting a given 367 
reward. When making its initial choice between the SS option and the LL option, both of 368 
these options are available to the animal; but assuming a certain risk that its chosen option 369 
will be lost during the delay (DSS + δ or DLL + δ) it has to wait before it can collect the 370 
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reward, the reward value should be discounted accordingly. Now imagine that when time has 371 
run forwards to t + δ, both options are still available; neither has been lost during the 372 
preceding period. If the animal can update its assessment of the collection risk to take account 373 
of this fact, the economics of the choice situation have changed. The preceding period can be 374 
ignored and the animal should discount only over the remaining delay, DSS or DLL. This is the 375 
inverse of the situations considered earlier (where a constant delay was added to both 376 
options), and can therefore support preference reversal over time as the optimal behaviour 377 
under some conditions. In Fig. 6 we illustrate this for a one-off choice with a non-zero 378 
opportunity cost (Fig. 6a) and for an infinite sequence of repeated choices (Fig. 6b). 379 
Preference reversal occurs in opposite directions in these two situations, as was the case when 380 
a constant delay was added to both options (sections 3.2 and 4.1). Most empirical data 381 
support the pattern shown in Fig. 6b, in which the animal becomes increasingly impatient as 382 
time passes. 383 
Case 2: the passage of time has no effect on the estimated probability of collecting a 384 
given reward. Alternatively, the animal may not know at the later time point whether either 385 
of the options is still available. Although there is less time remaining before it can collect its 386 
chosen reward, it should also take into account the chance the reward was lost during the 387 
preceding period from t to t + δ. Thus it should still discount the rewards over the original 388 
delays DSS + δ and DLL + δ. No preference reversal is expected in this case: the animal faces 389 
exactly the same economic situation as before, so it should stick by its original decision. 390 
So, whether we expect an animal to show preference reversal over time depends 391 
critically on the information it has about the continuing availability of the options as time 392 
passes (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005). Many previous studies have overlooked this key 393 
consideration or have otherwise conflated two distinct types of preference reversal. 394 
 395 
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6. Summary of predictions 397 
 398 
In Table 1 we summarise the main features of optimal behaviour in the various 399 
different choice situations we have considered. Starting from some relatively modest 400 
assumptions, our general model yields a surprisingly rich array of predictions. Preference 401 
reversals may occur whenever there is a non-zero opportunity cost, in other words whenever 402 
the animal loses opportunities to forage elsewhere while it is waiting for delayed rewards. 403 
However, the expected direction of preference reversal depends on whether the choice 404 
situation is a one-off or is repeated. When choice is repeated, optimal behaviour leads to the 405 
form of preference reversals documented in the empirical literature, with greater patience for 406 
more delayed rewards. However, under these same conditions we predict no effect of the 407 
reward ratio RLL/RSS. Conversely, in a one-off choice with a non-zero opportunity cost we 408 
predict lower rates of discounting for larger rewards, but preference reversals in the opposite 409 
direction to that typically seen in experiments. Thus, although our model successfully 410 
predicts isolated features of intertemporal choice behaviour, no single version of the model 411 
can account for all of the empirically observed patterns. To understand how animals evaluate 412 
delayed rewards, it seems that we need to take into account additional factors besides the 413 
ones we have focused on here, collection risk and opportunity cost. For example, we might 414 
incorporate certain constraints on decision making, such as discrimination biases (Stephens, 415 
2002; Stephens et al., 2004) or uncertain interruption rates (Sozou, 1998). At the same time, 416 
however, it is important to question whether animals are likely to be adapted to the 417 
intertemporal choice situations they encounter in the laboratory. In the next section we 418 
critically evaluate the ecological relevance of choice between delayed rewards. 419 
 420 
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7. Ecological relevance 422 
 423 
We have examined a series of simple choice scenarios in which a foraging animal is 424 
fully adapted to the rewards (Ri) and delays (Di) of alternative options, as well as to the 425 
frequency (α or λ) with which interruptions occur. This has been a useful exercise for 426 
identifying what choices the animal should make to maximise its long-term energy gain in 427 
these specific situations. But why would we expect animals to have evolved an ability to 428 
choose between rewards with different delays? What kinds of natural situations would entail 429 
such a choice, in which the animal has access to a given option but the reward cannot be 430 
harvested until a later point in time? Under what circumstances might patience be 431 
‘ecologically rational’ (Gigerenzer et al., 1999)? Several possibilities have been proposed. 432 
 433 
6.1. Fruit ripening (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005; Stevens and Stephens, 2008) 434 
When a frugivore encounters unripe fruit, it is faced with a choice between eating it 435 
immediately or waiting until it has ripened, in which case the energetic reward it gains will be 436 
greater. If, as seems likely, the animal is free to forage elsewhere while it is waiting for the 437 
fruit to ripen, this situation might reasonably be modelled as a one-off choice with zero 438 
opportunity cost. Assuming a constant collection risk (e.g. a risk that competing frugivores 439 
consume the fruit in the meantime), this predicts standard exponential discounting. However, 440 
since fruit is likely to become increasingly attractive to foragers as it ripens, the collection 441 
risk actually rises as time passes and so the assumption of a constant α is invalid. In addition, 442 
the timescale of fruit ripening is far greater than the delays used in self-control experiments, 443 
which typically last a few seconds or minutes. It is not yet known how animals devalue food 444 
items that they cannot eat until days or weeks later. 445 
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 446 
6.2. Extractive foraging (Stevens and Stephens, 2008) 447 
Some foods (e.g. nuts, shellfish) have to be extracted from hard, inedible cases before 448 
they can be consumed. Although the handling time imposes a fixed delay to the reward, it is 449 
unclear how well this corresponds to the self-control paradigm studied experimentally. First, 450 
it is not obvious what the alternative, more immediate option is, unless the animal has a range 451 
of different food types it can exploit in the same habitat. Second, it seems likely that in most 452 
cases of extractive foraging the collection risk will be negligible. Finally, from a mechanistic 453 
rather than functional perspective, the animal may already gain some psychological 454 
reinforcement from handling a food item before it has extracted the food (Shettleworth and 455 
Jordan, 1986). 456 
 457 
6.3. Caching for the winter (Stevens and Stephens, 2008, 2009; Stevens, 2010) 458 
A variety of birds and mammals cache food for later use, and this has been interpreted 459 
as a preference for a delayed reward over immediate consumption. On closer inspection, 460 
however, this type of behaviour differs in important ways from the kind of situation studied 461 
in impulsiveness tests in the laboratory. When an animal faces a choice between caching a 462 
given food item or eating it now, it could be argued that the immediate and delayed options 463 
have the same reward magnitude, whereas in the self-control paradigm the delayed reward is 464 
bigger (generating a conflict between reward size and time cost). If anything, cached food 465 
will provide a smaller net energetic gain when it is eventually consumed, because of decay 466 
and the energetic cost of recovering it (e.g. digging it up). The fitness value of the food item 467 
may nevertheless be greater when it is recovered and eaten in midwinter than if it was eaten 468 
when found earlier in the year, because the background rate of gain from foraging has 469 
declined dramatically and the animal may be closer to starvation. But this situation is rather 470 
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different from the self-control paradigm, in which rewards are delayed by seconds or minutes 471 
and changes in the animal’s state can be disregarded. Instead, the decision to cache seems to 472 
be driven by other factors that are missing from the self-control set-up. Most probably, the 473 
animal has been selected to cache for the winter to guard against the risk of energetic shortfall 474 
during a predictable period of poor foraging success. At the same time, caching may allow it 475 
to use additional resources when it is already satiated, as suggested by the fact that caching 476 
typically occurs at a time when excess food is available (Smith and Reichman, 1984). 477 
 478 
6.4. Patch leaving (Stephens and Dunlap, 2009, 2011; Stephens et al., 2004; Stevens and 479 
Stephens, 2009; Stevens, 2010) 480 
Stephens and colleagues have framed the classic patch-leaving problem of behavioural 481 
ecology in terms of the self-control paradigm. In this view, the decision to remain in a given 482 
foraging patch and keep searching for additional food items represents choice for a more 483 
immediate reward, whereas leaving the patch and travelling to a new one represents choice 484 
for a delayed, but potentially larger, reward (Stephens et al., 2004). When the distribution of 485 
food is highly clustered there is a clear opportunity cost, since while travelling between 486 
patches the animal cannot continue to feed. However, as Stephens and Dunlap (2009) point 487 
out, the patch-leaving problem differs from the self-control problem in having a nested 488 
decision structure: choice of one option (‘stay’) requires the animal eventually to choose the 489 
other option (‘leave’) before the same choice is repeated. Interestingly, blue jays (Cyanocitta 490 
cristata) make better long-term decisions in the self-control situation (Stephens and Dunlap, 491 
2009). 492 
 493 
6.5. Sequential mate search (Stevens, 2010) 494 
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Discussions of intertemporal choice typically revolve around foraging decisions, but 495 
similar issues may apply in other domains. In a mate-choice context, a female’s decision to 496 
reject a low-quality male in the hope she will later find a superior mate could be viewed as 497 
choice for a larger, later reward. This is not exactly equivalent to the standard self-control 498 
paradigm, in particular because the delay to the later option and the size of the associated 499 
reward (the exact quality of the superior mate) are both uncertain, but there are some 500 
intriguing parallels. This kind of situation might also generate some interesting 501 
complications, such as changes in the degree of impulsiveness over time; for example, 502 
unpaired females are likely to become increasingly impatient as the end of the mating season 503 
approaches. An analogous effect has been noted for diving animals, which should become 504 
less selective in their foraging as they near the time at which they have to return to the surface 505 
for air (Houston and McNamara, 1985). 506 
 507 
In summary, despite some superficial similarities, there appear to be few—if any—biological 508 
situations that correspond directly to the self-control paradigm used in laboratory tests of 509 
impulsive behaviour. On this basis, we question whether it is reasonable to expect that natural 510 
selection has furnished animals with the decision rules for behaving rationally (i.e. in a way 511 
that maximises their gains) in these particular experimental set-ups (Houston, 2009; Houston 512 
et al., 2007; McNamara and Houston, 1980, 2009). Some of the apparently short-sighted 513 
behaviours observed in the laboratory may be the product of rules that work well in more 514 
naturalistic situations such as patch exploitation (Stephens 2002). Future work on the 515 
adaptive basis of impulsiveness should identify what kinds of rules perform well in 516 
ecologically relevant scenarios and use these rules to predict behavioural patterns in 517 
laboratory experiments like the self-control paradigm. The current trend for post hoc 518 
ecological explanations of why certain taxa exhibit higher or lower discounting rates in 519 
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laboratory experiments (e.g. Addessi et al., 2011; Cheng et al., 2002; Rosati et al., 2007; 520 
Stevens et al., 2005a,b) needs to be paired with a predictive, model-based approach to 521 
understanding animal behaviour. 522 
 523 
 524 
8. Key points 525 
 526 
We finish by summarising some key points from our analysis. 527 
1. Depending on the precise situation considered, optimality models of choice between 528 
delayed rewards can predict a range of different types of behaviour—including no 529 
preference reversal, preference reversal in either direction, lower discounting rates for 530 
bigger rewards or no effect of reward magnitude. Exponential discounting is expected only 531 
under certain circumstances. 532 
2. To predict how an animal should respond, we need to know more than just the rewards 533 
and delays of the available options. We also need to know what information is available to 534 
the animal and what it perceives about the current situation. Of critical importance is 535 
whether the animal has evolved to expect one-off choices, repeated choices or can adjust 536 
its behaviour flexibly depending on the persistence of the current situation. 537 
3. Preference reversals over time are not equivalent to preference reversals across separate 538 
choice situations. Whether preferences should reverse over time depends on the 539 
information the animal has about the continuing availability of the rewards. 540 
4. The structure of the self-control paradigm used in laboratory experiments does not fit most 541 
intertemporal choice situations in the natural environment. Expecting animals to behave 542 
rationally in self-control tests might therefore be unrealistic.  543 
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Table 1. Summary of optimal behaviour in a number of simple situations involving a choice 708 
between a smaller, sooner (SS) option offering a relatively small reward (RSS) after a short 709 
delay (DSS) and a larger, later option (LL) offering a larger reward (RLL) after a longer delay 710 
(DLL). While waiting for a delayed reward there is an opportunity cost γ per unit time, plus a 711 
risk either that random interruptions eliminate the chosen reward (average interruption rate α) 712 
or that they terminate the entire foraging sequence (average termination rate λ). 713 
 714 
Choice situation 
(n = number of cycles) 
Quantity 
maximised 
Preference reversal Large rewards 
discounted 
less/more/same? 
with added 
delay 
over time* 
One-off choice (n = 1)     
no opportunity cost iD
ieR

 none none same 
with opportunity cost 
i
D
i DeR
i    LL → SS SS → LL less 
Repeated choice, uncertain n  1iDi eR   SS → LL LL → SS same 
Repeated choice, infinite n   iDi DeR i  SS → LL LL → SS same 
 715 
* Assuming that the animal always knows that both options are still available. (In the absence of this 716 
information, no preference reversal is predicted.) 717 
  718 
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Fig. 1. A diagrammatic illustration of the self-control paradigm. Time runs from left to right, 719 
and the choices of a hypothetical animal are indicated by thick lines. (a) At the point 720 
indicated by the question mark, the animal chooses between a relatively small reward (RSS) 721 
delivered after a relatively short delay (DSS) and a larger reward (RLL) delivered after a longer 722 
delay (DLL). The animal is said to choose impulsively if it prefers the more immediate option 723 
(SS) even when the more delayed option (LL) offers a higher rate of gain. (b) Preference 724 
reversal across separate choice situations: in a similar choice situation in which the delays 725 
have been extended to DSS + δ and DLL + δ, the animal may instead prefer the more delayed 726 
option (LL). (c) Preference reversal over time: if the animal has the opportunity to alter its 727 
initial decision after time δ has elapsed, it may switch to the more immediate option (SS). 728 
 729 
Fig. 2. A graphical method for identifying the best option from a discrete set of alternatives 730 
(each represented by a circle) differing in their reward amount Ri and delay Di, where 731 
interruptions to foraging occur at rate α and the opportunity cost per unit time of waiting for 732 
delayed rewards is γ. When there is no opportunity cost (γ = 0), the best option maximises the 733 
expected energetic gain i
D
ieR

. Lines of constant fitness (dashed line) are horizontal and the 734 
best option (labelled A) is the one that reaches the highest point along the vertical axis. When 735 
there is a non-zero opportunity cost (γ > 0), the total opportunity cost iD  increases with the 736 
time spent waiting, so lines of constant fitness (dotted line) slope upwards with increasing 737 
delay (since a greater expected energetic gain is needed to compensate for a longer delay). 738 
The best option (labelled B) maximises the expected energetic gain minus the total 739 
opportunity cost iD . 740 
 741 
Fig. 3. Change in the expected pay-offs from choosing a smaller–sooner (SS) reward (grey) 742 
or a larger–later (LL) reward (black) in a one-off choice situation, when an extra delay is 743 
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added to both options. The rewards offered are RSS = 1 for the SS option and RLL = 11 for the 744 
LL option, after delays of DSS = 1 and DLL = 10 plus the added delay. The dashed line 745 
indicates that the LL reward is devalued even when there is no added delay, since DLL > DSS. 746 
The rate of interruptions is α = 0.1 per unit time and the total time available is T = 500. (a) 747 
When there is no opportunity cost of waiting for a reward (γ = 0), preference reversal does 748 
not occur. (b) When there is an opportunity cost of waiting for a reward (γ = 0.1 per unit 749 
time), preference reversal can occur, with the optimal choice switching from LL to SS as the 750 
added delay increases. 751 
 752 
Fig. 4. Change in the expected pay-offs from choosing a smaller–sooner (SS) reward (grey) 753 
or a larger–later (LL) reward (black) in continually repeated cycles of the same choice 754 
situation, when an extra delay is added to both options. The rewards offered are RSS = 1 for 755 
the SS option and RLL = 11 for the LL option, after delays of DSS = 1 and DLL = 10 plus the 756 
added delay. The dashed line indicates that the LL reward is devalued even when there is no 757 
added delay, since DLL > DSS. The rate of interruptions is α = 0.1 per unit time and the total 758 
time available is T = 500. Preference reversal can occur, with the optimal choice switching 759 
from SS to LL as the added delay increases. 760 
 761 
Fig. 5. Change in the expected pay-offs from choosing a smaller–sooner (SS) reward (grey) 762 
or a larger–later (LL) reward (black) in an uncertain number of cycles of the same choice 763 
situation, when an extra delay is added to both options. The rewards offered are RSS = 1 for 764 
the SS option and RLL = 11 for the LL option, after delays of DSS = 1 and DLL = 10 plus the 765 
added delay. The dashed line indicates that the LL reward is devalued even when there is no 766 
added delay, since DLL > DSS. The rate at which random events terminate the entire choice 767 
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sequence is λ = 0.1 per unit time and the total time available is T = 500. Preference reversal 768 
can occur, with the optimal choice switching from SS to LL as the added delay increases. 769 
 770 
Fig. 6. The expected pay-offs from choosing a smaller–sooner (SS) reward (grey) or a larger–771 
later (LL) reward (black) in a reversible choice situation, in which the animal has the 772 
opportunity to switch to a previously rejected option before the associated delay expires and 773 
the reward can be collected (indicated by the dashed lines). The rewards offered are RSS = 1 774 
for the SS option and RLL = 11 for the LL option, after initial delays of DSS = 36 and DLL = 775 
45. The rate of interruptions is α = 0.1 per unit time and the total time available is T = 500. As 776 
time passes, the remaining delays for both options decrease. This can cause preference 777 
reversal if the animal has information that both rewards are still available. (a) In a one-off 778 
choice situation with an opportunity cost of waiting for a reward (γ = 0.1 per unit time), the 779 
best option changes from SS to LL as time passes. This is the reverse case of Fig. 3b. (b) 780 
When the choice situation is continually repeated, the best option changes from LL to SS as 781 
time passes. This is the reverse case of Fig. 4. Note that when the time to collection falls to 782 
zero, the expected pay-off (dashed lines) is infinite. 783 
  784 
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